Corruption in the Water Sector: Do ‘Water Mafias’ exist?
Given the Hollywood treatment through the movie Chinatown, we see the California ‘water wars’ in action. Conflicts between private landowners, municipalities, etc. exist to some extent or another, as does the general issue of sectoral (urban, agricultural, industrial) use and allocation. While, there are varied perspectives on how this issue plays out (“whiskey is for drinking. water is for fighting over” ? ) on the large integrated water resource management (IWRM) level (‘Big Water’) [and I often defer to those with IWRM expertise, to people such as David Zetland at Aguanomics or one of my PhD supervisors (2008 Stockholm Water Prize Winner) Dr. Tony Allan], this post focuses on what I like to call ‘Small Water’, or water at the level of the provision of and access to water.
At the level of household drinking water, water can perhaps be considered a (continuous, flowing) service if it is delivered though a utility service connection, but the reality for many in developing countries is water purchased in discrete units. Many of us have seen the ubiquitous 20 liter jerry cans in which water is sold and re-sold in urban areas.
Since water is therefore a product, rather than a service, it is not unreasonable to look at corruption in water as a market imperfection and/or something that happens as a result of poor market regulation. Water mafias have been documented in Nairobi, Delhi, Karachi, and many other places. Water mafias aim to collude, control markets, restrict supply, and keep shortages high.
I will always think back to this failed water supply initiative in the Kibera informal settlements of Nairobi as a classic case of the water mafia.
“The attitude and behaviour of city godfathers [emphasis mine] was considered by many to be the greatest hindrance to private sector participation in Kibera. It has been difficult to pass decisions aimed at improving distribution networks, billing, metering and putting together a coherent and sustainable system involving the various interested parties. In addition to this, it is known that City Council workers collude with unscrupulous persons to frustrate officially recognised connections…
In Kibera, there are power structures within the community that benefit from the opportunities for rent-seeking associated with the existing water supply system [emphasis mine] . There are vested interests within the local administration, to some extent embodied in the positions of the village elders. Political parties have also contributed to the form of the current water system, and people’s positions on water issues are influenced by party affiliations….
water sellers in the settlement are often linked to these power
structures [emphasis mine]…
Since water vendors and kiosk owners are private enterprises, it can be said that there is private sector participation. However, the relationship between these private enterprises and local officials is not the kind of public-private partnership envisaged by proponents of private sector participation [emphasis mine]…
Viewed as a whole, the project did not work. The objectives of the project have clearly not been met. There has been virtually no improvement in distribution, and water prices have not fallen. What remains is a sense of failure and frustration that may well undermine future initiatives.[emphasis mine]…
It might have been better if the project had never been started. [emphasis mine]”
What does this mean in terms of practical purposes for any new water supply initiative? The complete terrain of formal and informal participants in the supply, management, and distribution of water must be known and the government must be doing something to address any theft, control, or collusion. The Water Integrity Network (WIN) is a great resource for further reading in this area.
What are your thoughts? Do you know an example of a well-intentioned but failed WASH project?